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Abstract- The relevance of corporate governance principles in 
the management of corporate organisations cannot be 
underestimated. The increasing influence of principles of 
corporate governance across the globe has been greatly linked to 
the recent corporate frauds and scandals. These frauds and 
scandals largely resulted from the failure of authorities of 
countries to effectively implement the legal and regulatory 
frameworks pertaining to corporate governance. Ghana is 
archetypal in regards to the failure of authorities to enforce the 
laws and regulations in relation to corporate governance. During 
the enforcement of the laws and regulations of corporate 
governance, some vitally important issues are either overlooked 
or deliberately deserted. This paper attempts to examine the legal 
and regulatory framework of Ghana in regards to corporate 
governance and points out the importance of complying with 
good corporate governance. It also highlights prevailing issues of 
corporate governance practice in Ghana. It finally makes some 
recommendations, which are considered the major contribution 
of this paper.     
 
Index Terms- Prospects, Challenges, Corporate Governance, 
Ghana 
I. INTRODUCTION 
ood corporate governance has been highlighted to be vital 
to corporate organisations especially in transition and 
emergent economies. The effectiveness of a company’s corporate 
governance structure has a far-reaching effect on how well it 
functions. A corporation that embarks on good corporate 
governance practice offers essential information to its equity 
holders and other stakeholders to minimize information 
asymmetry. Financial scandals that are currently happening 
across the globe and the recent collapse of major corporate 
organisations in the US, Europe and other parts of the world have 
made corporate governance to take on  the centre stage for 
academic and professional discourse. Thus what does corporate 
governance really mean?  
        Corporate governance could be defined as ‘the application 
of a set of powerful micro-policy instruments in an organisation 
to ensure an efficient and effective use of resources in achieving 
the main objectives of its capital providers, succeed in the 
competitive market, as well as maximizing its positive influence 
on other stakeholders and at the same time, minimizing its 
negative impacts on them’ (Castellini & Agyemang, 2012). 
Corporate governance is the connection among various 
participants-such as Chief executives, shareholders, management 
and employees- in determining a firm’s direction and 
performance (Monks & Minow, 1996). It has also been defined 
by Lamm (2010) as the use of formality, thoroughness and 
transparency to an amalgamated structure of corporate policy in 
order to ensure that only prudent risks are taken by the corporate 
organisation to achieve shareholder value as well as to succeed in 
the market. From the aforementioned definitions, we contend that 
corporate governance is represented by laid down structures and 
procedures to mitigate the level of agency costs in a corporate 
organisation.  
        The capability of a corporate organisation to entice or attract 
capital providers is subject to how effective its corporate 
governance practice is, since this will induce capital providers to 
invest with the hope that, they are investing in a credible 
company that will safeguard their investments, and in the end 
reward them appropriately. By all, not to be rewarded today or 
tomorrow, but also to be rewarded in five, ten, twenty, or fifty 
years later. Also, an effective corporate governance practice 
improves the reputation of a corporate business by making it 
more attractive to customers and suppliers (Lipman & Lipman, 
2006).  Kaen (2003) posits that the actual value of a corporate 
business is what capital providers or investors will make 
available to the corporate business on the basis of its anticipated 
returns to its owners.  
        Currently, countries are encountering different challenges in 
their attempt to developing/designing effective corporate 
governance principles that can be actively implemented as well 
as reliable. These challenges if not appropriately dealt with could 
thwart the administration of corporate organisations and other 
vitally important institutions in the concerned economy. In order 
to overpower these challenges, the constituent elements of good 
corporate governance are needed to be appropriately highlighted. 
The common constituent elements of good corporate governance 
are efficiency, probity, responsibility, transparency and 
accountability (CACG Guidelines, 1999). However, due to the 
prevailing economic meltdowns across the globe, there is no 
doubt that the implementation of the principles of good corporate 
governance is vitally significant to ensuring good corporate 
governance in every economy. It is against this backdrop that this 
paper attempts to highlight some confronting challenges in 
regards to corporate governance practice in Ghana. It also brings 
out some recommendations that can help improve corporate 
governance practice in Ghana. 
        The remainder of the paper is as follows: section II 
examines the legal and regulatory framework pertaining to 
corporate governance in Ghana. The prevailing condition of 
corporate governance is highlighted in section III. Section IV 
G 
                      
 
 
addresses the importance of corporate governance principles. 
Finally, section V, deals with the conclusions and 
recommendations of the paper.        
 
II. LEGAL AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK OF CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE IN GHANA 
        The regulatory framework for an effective corporate 
governance practice in Ghana is contained in the Companies 
code 1963 (Act 179), Securities Industry Law 1993 (PNDCL 
333) as revised by the Securities Industry (Amendment) Act, 
2000 (Act 590) and the listing regulations, 1990 (L.I. 1509) of 
the Ghana Stock Exchange.  In the context of this paper, the 
regulatory framework of Ghana for effective corporate 
governance has been divided into six major sections, namely: 1) 
the mission, responsibilities and accountability of the board; 2) 
committees of the board; 3) relationship to shareholders and 
stakeholders, and the rights of shareholders; 4) financial affairs 
and auditing; 5) disclosures in annual reports; and 6) code of 
ethics. It may be useful now to proceed to discuss in detail the 
various sections of the regulatory framework of Ghana. 
 
Section i: The mission, responsibilities and accountability of 
the board of directors  
        This section specifies the principal objective of the board of 
directors of a corporate entity. The board of directors is to ensure 
that the corporate entity is properly managed in order to 
safeguard and enhance stockholders value and to meet the 
corporate entity’s obligation to: 1) stockholders; 2) the industry 
in which it operates; and 3) the law. However, it also states that 
the interests of other stakeholders are significant as a derivative 
of the duty of stockholders. 
        Furthermore, this section brings out the primary 
responsibility of the board of directors. That is, they are to ensure 
that good corporate governance prevail within them. This section 
also clearly states the principal duties of the board: 
1) The strategic guidance of the corporate entity in keeping 
its goals. 
2) Overseeing or supervising the management of the 
business. 
3) Identification of risk as well as the implementation of 
systems that manage risk. 
4) Succession planning and the appointments, training, 
remuneration and replacement of senior management. 
5) Supervision of internal control system. 
6) Maintenance of the corporate entity’s communications 
and information dissemination policy. 
 
        The principle also reflects the sovereign rights of 
shareholders, since the boards of directors, who are to ensure that 
effective corporate governance prevails, are accountable to 
shareholders.  
Again, this section of the principle brings out how the size of the 
board should be. It states that, the board’s size of every corporate 
entity ought to be arrived at with the belief of promoting the 
board’s effectiveness as well as ensuring appropriate 
representational needs. However, no specific number is set with 
regard to membership but goes on to mention between 8-16 
members. The method of appointment to the board should be 
formal and transparent, and that shareholders should be provided 
with adequate information on all persons to be appointed. These 
information includes: name, age and country of residence; 
whether appointment is executive and if so the specific area of 
responsibility; working experience; shareholding in the corporate 
entity as well as its subsidiaries; family ties with any director 
and/or substantial stockholder of the corporate entity; and any 
conflict of interest. 
        The leadership structure of the corporate organisation is 
clearly stated in this section of the principle. It states that there 
should be a separation of the roles of the chairperson and the 
CEO. In addition, in the event of this separation, the relationship 
between the CEO and the Chairperson with their respective 
responsibilities should be formally defined or stated.  
        The section, in addition, specifies the composition of the 
board. It states that the board should include a balance of 
executive directors and NEDs with a complement of independent 
NEDs being at least one third of the total membership of the 
board. The appointments of the NEDs should ordinarily be a 
matter for the board as a whole and the selection procedure ought 
to be based on merit.  It defines  the  independence of a director 
based on the following criteria, he/she: is not a substantial 
stockholder of the corporate entity; is not an employee of the 
corporate business,  is not a professional advisor or consultant to 
the corporate entity; is not a supplier or customer; no contractual 
connections with the corporate business; and free from any other 
relationships with the corporate entity, which may interfere with 
his or her ability to carry out his/her responsibilities 
independently. This section also specifies that all directors (i.e., 
Executive and NED) should have unrestricted access to all 
corporate business’ information, records and documents. 
        In order for the board to discharge its duties effectively, this 
section states that the board should meet regularly and in the case 
of listed corporate entities, it should be at least six times a year. It 
further states that board committees are required to meet 
frequently in order to properly discharge their duties in an 
efficient and effective manner. However, the attendance of 
directors, particularly NEDs, at these meetings should be a major 
factor to let them continue to remain on the board.     
 
Section ii: Committees of the board 
        The section directs the board to constitute committees as it 
may deem appropriate to help it in carrying out its duties. It 
further stipulates that the constitution of such committees may 
include non-members of the board on a condition that the 
responsibility for any decisions or recommendations made shall 
remain only with directors who are members of the committee. 
In addition, the board’s committees and their members should be 
published in the company’s annual report. 
        The committees mentioned under this section are: the audit 
committee and remuneration committee. The audit committee 
should compose of at least three directors, of whom the majority 
should be NEDs. The membership of the committee should be 
those with adequate knowledge on finance, accounts and the 
basic elements of the laws under which the company operates. It 
further states that the chairperson of the audit committee should 
be a NED. 
        Furthermore, this section points out the primary functions of 
the audit committee. These are to: 
                      
 
 
1. recommend the appointment of the external auditors of 
the corporate organisation; 
2. liaise with external auditors for the purposes of 
upholding and ensuring audit quality, effectiveness, risk 
assessment/evaluation, interaction with internal auditors 
and dealing with situations governing the resignation of 
an external auditor; 
3. review adequacy of systems of internal control and of 
the degree of compliance with material policies, laws 
and the code of ethics as well as business practices of 
the corporate organisation; 
4. provide a direct conduit of communication between the 
board, and the external auditor, internal auditors,  
accountants and compliance officers (if any) of the 
corporate organisation; 
5. report to the board of all issues of significant 
extraordinary financial transactions; and  
6. help the board in developing corporate strategies that 
would improve board control and operating structures of 
the corporate organisation. 
 
        Nevertheless, this section states that the audit committee: 
should have an authority to investigate any issue under its term 
of reference; be provided with the necessary apparatus to 
perform such investigation; and should have full access to 
regular and timely information. In addition, audit committee 
should also carry out an annual review of the corporate entity’s 
internal control over financial, operational and compliance issues 
and report on the same to shareholders in the annual report of the 
company. 
 
Section iii: relationship to shareholders and stakeholders 
        This section stipulates that corporate governance structures 
employed by the board should not be geared towards 
stakeholders’ benefit at the expense of shareholders but should 
endeavour to increase shareholder value by monitoring and 
maintaining stakeholder relationships effectively and 
professionally.  
        In addition, this section emphasises the rights of 
shareholders. These include: secure methods of ownership 
registration; convey or transfer shares; obtain timely and regular 
information on the firm; partake in voting; elect board members; 
share in the profits of the corporate business. Furthermore, 
shareholders have the right to partake in, and to be satisfactorily 
informed about decisions concerning fundamental changes such 
as: amendments of the statutes, or articles of incorporation or 
similar governance documents of the firm; the authorization of 
additional shares; variation of class rights; and extraordinary 
transactions that in effect result in the sale of the corporate 
business.  
        This section also points out the principle of equitable 
treatment of all shareholders. This principle: 1) requires equity 
ownership over and above specified thresholds to be disclosed; 
2) ensures that market for corporate control of listed firms 
functions in an efficient and transparent way; and 3) specifies the 
rules and procedures governing the acquisition of corporate 
control with the goal of ensuring impartial treatment of all 
stockholders. In addition, minority stockholders are given the 
opportunity to obtain effective redress for violation of their 
rights. All shares issued unless otherwise specified rank pari 
passu (of equal step) with other share of the same class and in the 
case of ordinary shares, one share bears one vote. The section 
further forbids and punishes insider trading and self-dealing. 
 
Section iv: financial affairs and auditing 
        This section deals with the financial governance, financial 
reporting and disclosure of price sensitivity information 
responsibilities of the board, duties of external auditors, audit 
report, departures or deviations from standards, rotation of audit 
personnel and removal or resignation of an auditor. 
        The financial governance responsibilities of the board of 
directors under this section describe four main responsibilities, 
including: 
1. maintaining satisfactory records for protecting the assets 
of the corporate organisation; 
2. making sure that the statutory payments payable by the 
corporate organisation are executed on time; 
3. making sure that the structures of internal control are 
present for monitoring risk, adherence to financial 
governance structures and compliance with the law; and 
4. ensuring that the financial statements of the company 
are audited at such regular intervals as described by law, 
regulations or internal policies of the company by 
experienced and well-qualified auditors.      
 
        Also, the financial reporting responsibilities of the board of 
a company are defined in this section: 
1. the accurateness of information contained in financial 
statements; 
2. making sure required accounting policies have been 
consistently employed in the preparations of the 
financial statement; 
3. making sure the annual financial statements of the 
company are presented according to the financial 
standards of Ghana National Accounting Standards 
(GNAS) and other accounting standards; 
4. ensuring annual and interim financial statements of the 
company are dispersed to stockholders and regulators 
within the time frames described by law and regulation; 
5. making sure annual and interim financial statements are 
prepared effectively in a sense that it can facilitate 
comparability; 
6. making sure the report of auditors on financial 
statements are faithfully reproduced to the users of such 
statements; and 
7.  ensuring that a balanced and comprehensible evaluation 
is provided in the financial and operating results of the 
company in financial statements. 
 
        Moreover, the disclosures of price sensitive responsibilities 
of board of directors of listed companies are also described in 
this section. These include: 1) disseminating price sensitive 
information to the market and stockholders in a timely way; 2) 
requesting a temporary suspension in the securities of the 
company where a disclosure may cause unpropitious price 
movements in the market for the company’s securities. 
The role of the external auditor of a company is also defined in 
this section. It states that the external auditor should be a primary 
                      
 
 
source of an objective, independent and effective opinion on 
financial statements of the company. This section urges the 
auditor to apply diligence, objectiveness and independence in the 
execution of his or her duties. In addition, the external auditor is 
to make sure that the audit of the company is conducted in 
accordance with the one required by the Institute of Chartered 
Accountants, Ghana (ICAG). This section further asserts that, the 
external auditor is required to indicate in his or her report if 
financial statements audited have been prepared in accordance 
with the GNAS standards.  
        Furthermore, the external auditor is required to specify any 
departures from accounting standards and should contain the 
auditors’ opinion as to whether or not the departure is not 
intentional and also give reasons for such departure. Meanwhile, 
in order to ensure a continued effectiveness of audit, personnel 
including the audit partner should be frequently rotated or 
changed in order to offer fresh procedures in regards to audit 
work. Finally, the section put forth that the withdrawal, 
resignation or refusal to stand for re-election by an auditor should 
be followed by an explanation, which the corporate organisation 
ought to dispatch to stockholders. 
 
Section v: disclosures and annual report 
        This section mandates the presentation of annual audited 
accounts of a corporate entity before its shareholders as specified 
in the principles. It requires shareholders to be provided with 
information on: 1) the financial and operating outcomes of the 
corporate business; 2) the objectives of the corporate business; 3) 
major share ownership and voting rights; 4) material predictable 
with factors; 4) material issues regarding employees and other 
stakeholders; and 5) board members and key executives, and 
their remuneration. 
        Also, this part of the code does not rule out the 
establishment of remuneration committee with NEDs as majority 
of its members. In addition, executive directors who serve on the 
remuneration committee must exclude themselves from matters 
concerning their own compensation packages. It goes on to 
declare the primary function of the remuneration committee. 
These are: 1) instituting an official and clear procedure for 
mounting policy on executive compensation; 2) making sure that 
a suitable structure is instituted to give performance-oriented 
incentives to managers; and 3) inspecting executive service 
contracts with an idea of  discovering any unwarranted losses the 
corporate organisation may encounter in occasions of early 
service termination.  The membership of the remuneration 
committee and their policies should be disclosed during annual 
general meetings to shareholders in their annual report. The 
reports ought to contain at least the aggregate amount of fees, 
basic salaries, benefits in kind, allowances, pension contribution 
schemes, paid bonuses, paid compensations for office loss to 
directors and executive officers.          
 
Section vi: code of ethics  
        The section on code of ethics points out that every corporate 
organisation is directed to have its own code of ethics and 
statement of business practices, which should be implemented as 
part of the mechanisms that ensure effective corporate 
governance. Boards of directors are responsible for the 
formulation of such document. However, its content is applicable 
to the board and all employees. The board is also required to 
introduce a mechanism that monitors adherence and discipline 
deviations or breaches. 
 
Principles of corporate governance in Ghana: A Reflection 
        From the above discussion, it can be deduced that the 
principles of corporate governance of Ghana reflect shareholder 
perspective of the Anglo-American model of corporate 
governance. This is because the principles reflect the sovereign 
rights of shareholders, since the board of directors who are 
considered to be the principal mechanism to ensuring effective 
corporate governance has to account to shareholders. Also, the 
principles mirror the principles of corporate governance of 
CACG. Furthermore, the principles emphasise the traditional 
view where the board is regarded as representatives of 
shareholders. Finally, they obviously state the elements or factors 
that determine the effectiveness of the board as a mechanism for 
corporate control. These elements are the composition of the 
board, independence of the board, the leadership structure (CEO-
Chairperson separation), board committees such as the audit 
committee and remuneration committee, and access to timely and 
regular information by directors 
 
III. IMPORTANCE OF GOOD CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
PRINCIPLES 
        The increasing consciousness of good corporate governance 
practice across the length and breadth of the globe is extremely 
important. With effective corporate governance regime, there is 
little or no doubt that corporate authorities will be able to take 
decisions that will meet all stakeholders’ interests. It also offers a 
framework of probity, transparency, responsibility, 
accountability, checks and balances. Good corporate governance 
regime can absolve the harm that emanates from corporate 
deficiencies and address issues such as poor business leadership, 
unrelenting poor firm performance and a common wearing away 
of confidence in and around corporate organisations. It provides 
a framework for evaluating corporate organisations. In lieu of 
that, it makes possible for comparative analysis among all sectors 
of an economy. In addition, it forms the cornerstone for corporate 
governance guidelines for corporate organisations.  
In wrapping up on this sector, there is certainty that corporate 
governance guidelines promote effective and efficient allocation 
of resources, help corporate organisations in attracting capital at 
low cost and assist corporate organisations in maximising their 
performance as well as their capability in meeting community 
needs.          
 
IV. ISSUES PERTAINING TO CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN 
GHANA 
        Following Agyemang and Castellini (2013), this section will 
be analysed on the basis of a study conducted by these two 
authors on corporate governance practices in four large publicly-
held corporate organisations in Ghana. The authors employed a 
qualitative case study methodology in their study. This paper 
used their analysis in the sense that, the researchers wanted to get 
an in-depth appreciation of how corporate governance practice 
                      
 
 
prevails in large corporate organisations in Ghana. And since 
their research provided us with such appreciation, we considered 
it appropriate to use their analysis for our study. We therefore, 
present the prevailing condition of corporate governance based 
on their findings.  
        The shareholder perspective of corporate governance put 
forth that, the objective task of an organisation ought to focus 
only on those who have monetary share of the organisation. It 
considers organisations as devices for shareholders to maximize 
their investment returns, on the basis that theoretically, they (ie. 
shareholders) are residual claimants (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
As a result, effective corporate governance was defined in this 
study as to how the ownership structure and the board structure 
serve as good corporate governance mechanisms in reducing 
agency problem in an organisation, by narrowing the gap 
between the interests of shareholders and managers 
 
Ownership Structure and Ownership control 
        In their study in four publicly-listed corporations in Ghana, 
they found out that controlling shareholders function as monitors 
and controllers of managers. Controlling shareholders exert 
control over decisions of management via their incessant access 
to and selection (and the authority to dismiss) of key persons in 
the organisations, their frequent access to information and their 
activeness in decision-making processes of the organisations. 
With these possibilities, controlling shareholders induce 
management to take decisions that will maximize shareholder 
value and consequently, help reduce agency problem. In all 
organisations, controlling shareholders have the ultimate say on 
decisions during annual general meetings, in view of the fact 
that, they have the control rights. This allows them to pervasively 
influence decisions of management and as a result, management 
has to take actions to maximise shareholder value. The authors 
argued that the revelation of this ownership concentration in all 
four organisations studied, is a feature that cuts across all 
Ghanaian organisations listed on the Ghana Stock Exchange, and 
a number of organisations that are not listed. This revelation 
from the cases investigated in regards to the role of large 
shareholders is in line with the extant literature on corporate 
governance. Denise and McConnell (2003) opine that large 
shareholders have the incentive to use up resources to monitor 
and control management in order to make sure that their interests 
are met. Large shareholders are observed as vital corporate 
governance mechanism in the developing world in that; they 
strongly influence the course of effective corporate governance 
(Berglof & Claessens, 2004).  
 
Board Effectiveness 
        In regards to the board, the authors study concentrated on 
elements that are regarded vital in agency theory to determine 
board effectiveness in connection with board control. The 
elements examined in their study were: board composition, 
leadership structure of the board, director independence, 
meetings of board, board audit committee and board 
remuneration committee.  
 
Board Composition  
        The findings of their study indicate that in all organisations, 
the Non-executive directors form the majority of their boards. 
The degree to which board composition determines board 
effectiveness in connection with board control function is 
assessed to be low in three organisations of their study. In these 
three cases, boards do not get involved in the crucial elements of 
control in the organisations since controlling shareholders 
execute such operations. This observable fact from these three 
organisations confirms the findings in the extant literature that 
the existence of large shareholders has the propensity to weaken 
other corporate governance mechanisms (Berglof & Claessens, 
2004). It is only in one case that board composition was 
evaluated to settle on board control to a large extent. The board’s 
Non-executive directors do carry out all the crucial elements 
pertaining to board control in the organisation. This enhances the 
debate in the extant body of knowledge that boards can be 
effective governance mechanism (Berglof & Claessens, 2004; 
Denise & McConnell, 2003). However, their study highlights 
that boards can only become effective corporate governance 
mechanism only if large shareholders allow them (by means of 
absenting themselves from performing control-related 
operations) to carry out their control function in the corporate 
organisation. 
        The finding in regards to the number of Non-executive 
directors relative to the board size in all organisations studied 
meets the recommendations of the principles of corporate 
governance of Ghana, which states that at least one-third of 
board members should be Non-executive directors.   
 
Director Independence 
        In all organisations studied by the authors, the extent to 
which director independence drives board effectiveness relative 
to board control is high. Such director independence has the 
propensity to transform into effective and efficient control of 
management. However, their observable facts also show that 
although directors are independent of management, the subject of 
director independence in relation to controlling shareholders 
continue to be challenging. The prevailing condition where 
controlling shareholders are given rights to select directors, 
present a conundrum to director independence. This observable 
fact is in line with the extant body of knowledge in that; large 
shareholders in general, jeopardize director independence since 
large shareholders tend to have an authoritative command in 
relation to director appointment (Berglof & Claessens, 2004). In 
their conclusion, they argued that the aspect of director 
independence in all four organisations met the recommended 
guidelines by the principles of corporate governance of Ghana.  
 
Board leadership Structure     
        Their findings also reveal that the extent to which the 
division of the roles of the Chief Executive Officer and the board 
chairperson settles on board control is low for all four 
organisations studied. In regards to the suggested guidelines, the 
authors highlighted that the division of the roles in all four 
organisations meets the requirement of Ghana’s principles of 
corporate governance since one person does not perform the two 
roles. However, they argued that this separation in all four 
organisations do not conform to the guidelines of the principles 
in that, board chairpersons in these organisations are not 
independent of controlling shareholders.  
 




        The study also revealed that the extent to which board 
meetings settle on board effectiveness in regards to board control 
function is low for three organisations and high for one. They 
argued that, as with other determinants of board effectiveness, 
board meetings do not pave important way to board effectiveness 
with respect to board control in three organisations because their 
boards do not exert board control. In the remaining organisation, 
their findings highlighted that, board meetings settle on board 
control in that, they (ie. board meetings) represent platforms that 
offer the board to exert control over management and corporate 
decisions.  
        Their study showed that it is only in one of the four 
organisations studied that its board has put in place performance 
evaluation mechanism to assess the performance of directors, the 
CEO and the board. In their conclusion, they contended that three 
organisations do not meet the recommendation of the principles 
of corporate governance of Ghana.  
 
Board Audit Committee    
        Their study revealed that the role of the board audit 
committee in driving board control is low for three organisations 
and high for one. They argued that, as with other determining 
forces of board effectiveness, the establishment of board audit 
committees does not necessarily lead to board effectiveness in 
relation to board control function in three organisations in that, 
controlling shareholders perform extensive control over the 
organisations. This is in line with the extant literature that the 
ownership structure has influence on internal mechanisms of 
corporate governance (Berglof & Claessens, 2004). They also 
contended that, as a matter of fact, the ineffectiveness of board 
audit committees of these three organisations due to the presence 
of controlling shareholders makes the principles’ 
recommendation with respect to board committees irrelevant. 
They furthered that, since the board is ineffective due to the 
extensive control over its activities by the controlling 
shareholders, it could be envisaged that any committee 
established by the board will be ineffective.   
 
Board Remuneration Committee  
        Two of the organisations studied by the authors have 
established board remuneration committee. They however, 
argued that the role of the remuneration committee in 
determining board control is low for one of the two organisations 
and high for the remaining one. They continued that the 
establishment of board remuneration committees does not foster 
board control in these organisations (ie. low-scored 
organisations) in the sense that, their controlling shareholders 
perform extensive control over their operations. This is in line 
with the extant state of knowledge that the ownership structure 
has influence on internal mechanisms of corporate governance 
(Berglof & Claessens, 2004). 
 
V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Enforcing existing laws and regulations for effective corporate 
governance 
        It has been established that although Ghana has sufficient 
laws and regulations with respect to corporate governance, the 
major challenge is the absence of active devices for their 
effective enforcement.  Without an effective enforcement of the 
rules and regulations in regards to corporate governance, it will 
be very difficult for developing and transition economies to 
develop a strong and vibrant capital markets, which are currently 
regarded as important for sustainable economic development for 
countries (Shleifer & Vishny, 1986; Berglof & Claessens, 2004). 
On the basis of this issue, the recommended strategy to ensuring 
effective enforcement of existing laws and regulations is by 
recognising that the structure and capacity of the laws, and legal 
and regulatory framework are essential components of the 
corporate governance system. In achieving this, the following 
mechanisms have  been suggested by this study: improving the 
regulatory framework by making the laws accessible to all equity 
holders and the populace; fashioning effective mechanisms for 
law enforcement  as well as strengthening enforcement 
mechanisms (by providing training, logistics, equipments and so 
on); taking on alternative dispute resolution strategies; creating a 
conducive environment by keeping up the possible will to 
execute policies; creating an independent and intrepid judiciary; 
and encouraging the media to report issues of corporate 
governance and become more critical/judicious on issues of 
corporate governance. 
 
Protection of Minority Equity holders  
        An important aspect that was noted within the work of 
Agyemang and Castellini (2013) was the need to safeguard small 
equity holders against the abuses of large equity holders. 
Safeguarding of small equity holders is currently a very 
important issue in developing economies (Berglof & Claessens, 
2004) of which Ghana is no exception. The protection of small 
equity holders basically demands that the implementation of 
existing rules and regulations be improved.  It also requires a 
concurrent implementation of other strategies including the 
gaining of greater access to information, reviewing the current 
rules and regulations, educating small equity holders and the 
enforceability of existing recommendations and 
guidelines/principles.  
        Availability of information to small shareholders will enable 
them to challenge both management and large shareholders in 
relation to corporate decisions. This challenge will go round to 
prevent a potential diversion of corporate resources. Mechanisms 
for easy access to information by minority shareholders include 
the development of highly regarded bodies such as a well-
focused investigative financial body, brokerage firms and 
financial think-tanks that could assist in enhancing corporate 
governance practice. Empowering professional accounting and 
auditing bodies such as the ICAG should in addition, form part of 
the effort to improving corporate governance practice.    
        In order to protect the right of minority shareholders, they 
should be educated. This will make them aware of their rights to 
further reduce abuses from large shareholders. Educational 
campaigns can be carried out to bring about an understanding of 
their rights. Security and Exchange Commission of Ghana (SEC) 
and Ghana Stock Exchange (GSE) should also encourage 
organisations to organise educational symposiums, conferences, 
forums and so on to sensitize their shareholders on their rights. 
SEC and GSE can also encourage minority shareholders to form 
vibrant associations to safeguard their interests.  
                      
 
 
Reforming annual general meetings 
        An arrangement of a company’s internal corporate decision-
making processes helps in safeguarding minority shareholders. In 
their study, it was highlighted that, minority shareholders were 
not given ample time to express their grievances during annual 
general meetings. When board chairpersons chair those meetings, 
they may have an interest in safeguarding the board from 
shareholder criticisms. It is recommended that annual general 
meetings should be reformed so that they could be chaired by 
individuals who are independent of both management and 
boards. Those individuals should be elected by shareholders for 
each annual shareholder meeting. This will enable the board to 
be accountable to all shareholders. To give credence to this 
recommendation, regulatory bodies such as SEC and GSE ought 
to include this in the listing requirements of GSE.      
 
Employee representation 
        The recommendation of the principles of corporate 
governance of Ghana, which states that directors are supposed to 
consider the interests of other stakeholders, can only be 
manifested if other stakeholders such as employees are 
represented on boards. SEC should partake in achieving the 
‘consideration of other stakeholders’ in practice, and to try to 
include employee representation law. The trade unions such as 
the Trade Union Congress (TUC) of Ghana and the Ghana 
Federation of labour (GFL) should keenly deliberate on this 
subject and try to seek actual employee representation on boards 
as recommended by law. 
 
The issue of business accountability  
        The issue of business accountability of organisations to the 
Ghanaian community has relevant connotation with the 
development of corporate governance in Ghana. Corporate 
governance should be considered as a public policy matter, and 
attempts should be made to draw a clear distinction between 
corporate decision-making processes and political decision-
making processes. This subject needs to be dealt with as element 
of the wider initiative of improving effective corporate 
governance.  
 
Reviewing guidelines of corporate governance  
        Although the companies code 1963 does address the 
inequality between large shareholders and small shareholders, 
companies are not implementing this recommendation. The SEC 
and GSE should effectively persuade organisations to execute 
this recommendation. Also, SEC should conduct a seasonal 
evaluation to get hold of the extent of compliance by corporate 
organisations as well as occasionally reviewing guidelines. This 
will induce self-monitoring and help out in achieving good 
corporate governance.  
 
Divestiture policies and corporate governance 
        The essence of considering the consequences of 
privatization on corporate governance, and the eventual position 
of large shareholders in the decision-making processes of 
organisations, call for a revision of Ghana’s principles of 
corporate governance to protect minority shareholders. It has 
been deduced that instead of privatization via strategic 
investors/capital providers to empower local shareholders, it 
undermines them, and eventually makes them vulnerable to the 
expropriation problem.  The study recommends that future 
divestitures should also deal with the position of local 
shareholders.  
 
Recommendation regarding boards of directors 
Enhancing director independence 
        The issue of director independence has been identified as a 
major challenge in Ghana. In order to curb this, the positions 
should be announced in public with all the requirements so that a 
person who considers him/herself qualified would tender in 
his/her application. This means that directors will be recruited 
from the market by applying a free and fair mechanism of 
inviting applications from well-qualified people.   
 
Director evaluation  
        The idea of board evaluation is gaining grounds in the 
corporate community. This is because subjecting board of 
directors to any sort of evaluation is not something 
inappropriately silly. Due to this, it is recommended that 
organisations ought to put in place evaluation mechanisms. Huse 
(2007) opines that the actual form of evaluation may differ, but 
he goes on to recommend that the evaluation should be formal 
and regular, taking place at least once a year. Director evaluation 
can be executed under the leadership of an independent director, 
with support from external consultants. Various suggestions have 
been made in regards to the objectives and forms of board 
evaluation. Huse (2007) has grouped the objectives into two: 
Externally related objectives- which are associated with 
transparency; and Internally related objectives-which are 
associated with the development of internal effectiveness of the 
board by evaluating the manner in which the board conducts its 
business, by checking that all vital issues are appropriately 
prepared and deliberated, and by measuring the real contribution 
of each director to the board’s work in general, through his/her 
skills, competence and participation in board deliberations.  The 
board could hold a meeting at least once a year, at which time the 
assessment of the board chairperson, individual directors as well 
as the Chief executive officer’s  respective performances would 
be conducted. Steger et al (2004) suggest that if evaluations are 
undertaken meticulously and the procedure is well-designed and 
executed in a manner that all directors agree, with an assurance 
of confidentiality, these evaluations can bring gains to the board 
in general. However, the issue of individual board member 
evaluation is threatening in the sense that it can destroy the 
shared power and authority vested among board members as well 
as their common trust on the board. This study recommends a 
peer review mechanism-whereby individual directors are asked 
to evaluate the performance of every other director-or setting up 
a corporate governance committee, which should be composed of 
all Non-executive directors of the board to carry out such 
assessments. The result of these evaluations should be made 
available to shareholders each year in the annual reports, and the 
steps taken as a result. This recommendation can be executed by 
boards of directors. 
 
Introduction of new members  
        Orientation to a new job is vital for optimal performance 
(Huse, 2007). However, the study of the authors shows that 
                      
 
 
corporate organisations do not normally orient newly-appointed 
board members, or formally introduce them to their respective 
jobs. Newly-appointed directors should receive a formal method 
of orientation into the affairs of the organisation. This can be 
done by the board chairperson by making sure that all newly-
appointed directors are furnished with full, official and 
customized orientation on joining the board. Newly-appointed 
directors should be familiarised with the corporate organisation’s 
dealings and top management, its environment and be inducted in 
relation to their fiduciary roles and responsibilities as well as in 
regards to the expectation of the board. If a newly-appointed 




        Huse (2007, p. 194) argues that “the board itself, but, as the 
highest authority in the corporate structure, the board is 
responsible for its own job specification, including the 
boardroom culture”. The empirical observations from the cases 
show that organisations often do not educate their members on 
some of the nitty-gritty of accounting and auditing. The Cadbury 
Code of the UK highlights the role of directors’ education in this 
regard and pronounces their role as follows:  
        The weight of responsibility borne by all directors and the 
increasing commitment which their duties require emphasise the 
importance of the manner in which they prepare themselves for 
their posts. Given the varying backgrounds, qualifications and 
experience of directors, it is highly desirable that they should all 
undertake some form of internal or external training; this is 
particularly important for directors . . . with no earlier board 
experience 
        Since it is better to have competent and dynamic people in a 
bad structure than incompetent and inactive ones in a good 
structure, this study recommends that chairpersons of corporate 
organisations should make sure that board members consistently 
upgrade their skills and knowledge, as well as their considerable 
acquaintances with the organisations in order to bring into 
actuality successful board tasks-both on the board as well as on 
board committees. This is because; good corporate governance 
structure does not suffice everything, therefore the accentuation 
of the training of board members (Charkman, 2005).  
 
Board structure  
        The empirical observations of the study of Agyemang and 
Castellini (2013) have shown varied results with respect to the 
leadership structure in driving corporate governance 
effectiveness. It is recommended that the implementation of the 
split leadership structure should be carefully looked at, and its 
importance established, on a case-by-case basis. Although the 
companies code 1963 has recommended that the two roles ought 
to be separated, this is useful in circumstances where director 
independence is present. This is also the case of the board 
composition and the setting up of board committees. Boards of 
corporate organisations can work hand-in-hand with their 
shareholders in dealing with this issue.  
 
Recommendation for educational institutions 
        Recruiting from a market goes hand-in-hand with the 
development of a market for board members. The authors’ work 
has indicated that most organisations currently appoint either 
government functionaries or retired civil servants. This creates a 
lot of challenges to the organisations since most of these people 
do not normally possess skills in relation to private sector issues. 
As a result, there is the need to create a large pool of directors 
from which organisations could tap well-qualified and competent 
persons from. This is because if the competencies of board 
members are questionable, then the best system will prove 
frivolous. With true visionary, skillful, well-educated and 
competent board members, corporate strategies can be reviewed, 
approved and executed irrespective of the existing governance 
structure. This calls for the development of corporate governance 
practice via educational/training programmes. And this can be 
achieved by tasking universities, polytechnics and other 
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